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January 1967) Recent Developments 
BANKS AND BANKING-Bank's Liability for Breach 
of Its Duty to Corporate Depositor-Maley 
v. East Side Bank of Chicago* 
531 
The three stockholders of a close· corporation contracted to sell 
all of the corporate stock to Shulman for $5,000 down and a balance 
of $17,000 in two notes payable in thirty days.1 A resolution filed 
with the defendant depositary bank provided that Paul, the former 
president, was io act as the interim treasurer for the corporation and 
was to cosign, with Shulman, all checks drawn on the corporate ac-
count until the balance of the purchase price was tendered.2 Ap-
• ll61 F.2d ll9ll (7th Cir. 1966) [hereinafter cited as the principal case]. 
1. On the date of contract, the former officers and directors tendered their resigna-
tions which were held with the stock in escrow until Shulman had paid the balance. 
The company had been a going concern for three years, but at the date of the sale 
the liabilities greatly exceeded the assets. 
2. In addition to the resolution requiring co-signatures, the prior corporate resolu-
tions remained in effect. The relevant part of the prior resolutions reads as follows: 
Be it Resolved by the Board of Directors of C. M. Paul Lumber Co. 
1. That the East Side Bank of Chicago be and it is hereby designated as one 
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proximately one week after the agreement was made, the bank re-
ceived an inordinate number of inquiries regarding the credit of 
the corporation, each inquiry being directed to the single executive 
officer of the bank.3 Within thirty days Shulman paid the two out-
standing notes, and Paul informed the bank of Shulman's payment 
and the fact that Paul was no longer interested in the corporation.-i 
Shulman then signed a signature card as president and the only 
party entitled to negotiate corporate checks. 5 In the succeeding 
three weeks Shulman brought to the bank certified and cashiers 
checks payable to the corporation and endorsed by him either for 
cash or for deposit into his personal account.6 At the end of this 
period creditors of the corporation filed an involuntary petition in 
bankruptcy, and the trustee in bankruptcy instituted an action 
against the bank on the creditors' behalf. The court held that be-
cause of the bank's violation of the corporate resolutions which it 
had on file and the breach of its duty to the corporate depositor, 
the trustee can recover the value of checks payable to the corpora-
tion but cashed by Shulman for his personal use.7 
The relationship between a bank and its depositor is generally 
that of debtor and creditor.8 When the depositor is a corporation, 
of the depositaries of the funds of this Corporation and that the officers or em-
ployees of said Corporation are hereby authorized to endorse, in the name of 
this Corporation for the purpose of deposit and collection in and with said 
Bank, checks, drafts, notes • • • drawn to and owned by said Corporation • • • • 
2. That said Bank be and it is hereby authorized, to pay out the funds of 
this Corporation on deposit with it from time to time upon checks drawn upon 
said depositary and signed in the name of this Corporation by its President • • • 
whether said checks are payable to cash, bearer, or the order of the Corpora-
tion ••• or to the order of any signing or counter-signing officer of the Corpora-
tion ••• in either their individual or official capacity. 
3. That this Resolution shall be in full force and effect and binding upon 
this Corporation until it shall have been rescinded, and written notice of such 
rescission • • . delivered to said Bank. 
Brief for Appellee, p. 3. 
3. These inquiries were provoked by Shulman's efforts to purchase on credit large 
quantities of goods for sale. The executive officer of the defendant bank testified 
that he had received from 50 to 100 calls and that at no previous time had such fre-
quent inquiries been made concerning the credit position of this corporation or of 
any other customers of the bank. Moreover, at least one inquirer informed the bank 
that he considered Shulman's behavior "highly irregular." Principal case at 397, 399. 
4. Affidavit of Norman M. Paul, Appendix to Brief for Appellant, p. 469. Paul 
had previously advised the Bank that he was only acting as the treasurer of the 
company in order to cosign checks as a security measure until Shulman paid the 
balance of the purchase money. 
5. The bank also gave Shulman a new resolution form. Shulman informed the 
bank that it might be "a little while" before he returned the form, since he did not 
know who would be the new officers or directors of the corporation. This resolution 
was never returned to the bank. 
6. The checks were from customers who had purchased from Shulman the goods 
he had previously bought on credit. In all there were ten checks totalling over 
$46,000. 
7. Principal case at 402. 
8. See, e.g., Blakey v. Brinson, 286 U.S. 254 (1931); United States Cold Storage v. 
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moreover, the bank has a duty to scrutinize the transactions of the 
corporate officers so as to insure that funds are disbursed only ac-
cording to the approval and signature required by the deposit agree-
ment.0 Suspicious circumstances surrounding transactions may put 
the bank on inquiry, and breach of the duty to inquire may render 
the bank liable to the corporation for misappropriations.10 The 
scope of the duty to inquire varies according to the facts. Certainly 
once the bank is given notice of possible misappropriation, the duty 
to inquire entails more than a questioning of the suspected officer.11 
Indeed, if a bank has reason to believe that an officer is appropriat-
ing corporate funds for his personal use, the courts have generally 
held that the bank will have an obligation to question the directors 
as to the officer's authority. 
Three aspects of the bank-depositor relationship suggest that 
when the depositor is a one-man or close corporation, the tradi-
tional duty of the bank to inquire should be relaxed, if not elim-
inated completely.12 First, although the bank has an obligation to 
protect its corporate depositor from defalcations by an officer, in a 
one-man corporation the officer, in a very real sense, is the corpora-
tion. Inquiry in the traditional manner may well be futile, since 
the officer is likely to be less than candid about his own misappro-
priations.13 Second, if the depositor is a one-man corporation, the 
Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 343 Ill. 503, 175 N.E. 825 (1931); Speroff v. First-Central 
Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.2d 119 (1948). The Uniform Commercial Code 
retains the idea that a bank and its depositor have the relationship of debtor and 
creditor. See Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 
I, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962). 
9. E.g., National City Bank v. Harbin Elec. Co., 28 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1928); Miller 
v. First Granite City Nat'l Bank, 349 III. App. 347, llO N.E.2d 651 (1953). See also 
Weaver Constr. Co. v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 253 Iowa 1280, 115 N.W.2d 804 (1962). 
IO. See Havana Cent. R.R. v. Central Trust Co., 204 Fed. 546 (2d Cir. 1913), holding 
that the bank was not liable because circumstances were not such as to put the bank 
on inquiry. The mere fact that a check drawn on a corporate account is made pay-
able to the officer l'!ho signed the check is generally not notice that the funds are 
being misappropriated. See, e.g., Havana Cent. R.R. v. Central Trust Co., supra; Fidelity 
& Deposit Co. v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 223 Iowa 446, 273 N.W. 141 (1937). As the 
circumstances surrounding a transaction or series of transactions become increasingly 
suspicious, the courts tend to place on the banks the burden of inquiry to ascertain 
the officer's authority to transact. Cf. Mitchell v. First Nat'l Bank, 203 Ky. 770, 263 
S.W. 15 (1924). See generally BRITTON, Bxu.s AND NOTES §§ ll7-18 (2d ed. 1961). A 
bank which accepts checks payable to a corporation, endorsed by the president 
thereof, and deposited into the president's personal account is on notice of possible 
misappropriation of the proceeds. Mohr & Eichoff v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 237 
N.Y.S.2d 71 (N.Y. City Ct. 1962); cf. Wagner Trading Co. v. Battery Park Nat'l Bank, 
228 N.Y. 37, 126 N.E. 347 (1920); Weaver Constr. Co. v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 253 Iowa 
1280, 115 N.W.2d 804 (1962). 
ll. See Merrill, Bankers' Liability For Deposits of a Fidudary to His Personal Ac-
count, 40 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1077, HOO (1927); cf. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. 
People's Bank, 127 Tenn. 720, 157 S.W. 414 (1913). 
12. See generally Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man 
Company, 51 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1373 (1938); Note, 100 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 853 (1952). 
13. A general corollary to the traditional duty to inquire is that the bank will 
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entire burden of inquiry and verification would be carried by the 
bank, whereas when a larger corporation is involved, at least some 
of the responsibility for discovering misappropriation by an officer 
lies with the corporation, and the bank may assert as a defense the 
corporation's contributory negligence in failing to discover and pre-
vent the unauthorized transactions.14 A third, and perhaps more 
fundamental consideration is that a corporation is generally bound 
by the acts of its sole stockholder, and when he purports to act on 
behalf of his corporation, no action may be brought by the corpora-
tion to recover property appropriated for the stockholder's personal 
use.15 In Field v. Lew,16 for example, the court concluded that the 
president and sole stockholder acting on behalf of his corporation 
ratified his own actions, and the effect of this self-ratification was to 
deprive the corporation of its right of action against either the 
officer or any other person participating in the misappropriations.17 
Thus, in the case of a one-man corporation, because (1) a sole-stock-
holder can ratify his own actions and bind his corporation; (2) the 
bank's defense of contributory negligence is foreclosed; and (3) rea-
sonable inquiry seemingly would not reveal a fraud, it is difficult 
to contend that a bank should be liable for breach of a duty of 
inquiry owed to the corporation when the sole stockholder diverts 
corporate funds to his own purposes. 
Putting to one side the question of the depositary bank's liabil-
ity, the question also arises as to the existence of a cause of action 
in an insolvent corporation's creditors when the corporation itself 
would have no right to sue. Generally, the right of a trustee in 
bankruptcy to maintain an action on behalf of the creditors for 
not be liable where reasonable· inquiry would not have revealed a misappropriation 
or breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation. ·Moore &: Co. v. Champaign Nat'l Bank, 
13 Ill. App. 2d 232, 141 N.E.2d 97 (1957); Kinstlinger v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 
280 App. Div. 729, 117 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1952). Compare Ward v. City Trust Co., 192 
N.Y. 61, 84 N.E. 585 (1908). 
14. Cf. Stone &: Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 
184 N.E.2d 358 (1962); Moore &: Co. v. Champaign Nat'l Bank, supra note 13. See also 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-406, 4-406. 
15. Cawthra v. Stewart, 109 N.Y. Supp. 770, 14 A.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1908). The 
trend of authority is to bind the corporation by acts on its behalf by a person or 
persons owning all the stock, even though there is a defect in some corporate step 
or action, 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1004 (1940); see, e.g., In re Michael J. Hughes &: 
Co., 110 F. Supp. 577 (D.N.J. 1953); Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Becklenberg, 300 Ill. 
App. 453, 21 N.E.2d 152 (1939). Where one man completely controls a corporation, 
he is deemed to have power to do all acts which the board of directors could have 
authorized. Renault v. L. N. Renault &: Sons, 188 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1951); accord, 
Mid-Continent Constr. Co. v. Goldberg, 40 Ill. App. 2d 251, 188 N.E.2d 511 (1963). 
16. 184 F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), afj'd, 296 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1961). Here the 
bank accepted a corporate check drawn by its president and sole stockholder and 
applied the proceeds to his personal indebtedness to the bank. 
17. "In that case the unauthorized acts of the individual become the authorized 
acts of the corporation, the corporation loses its right of action against the officer •••• " 
184 F. Supp. at 27. Accord, Cunningham v. Jaffe, 251 F. Supp. 143 (D.S.C. 1966). 
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conversion or misappropriation is contingent upon a preexisting 
right in the corporation.18 However, when the corporation is insol-
vent at the time of the misappropriations, there is considerable 
authority for the proposition that the rights of the creditors are 
superior to the rights of both the corporation and the corporate 
stockholders.19 In the leading case of McCandless v. Furlaud,20 the 
court conceded that unanimous shareholder approval could often 
legitimate the otherwise wrongful acts by corporate officers. The 
court added, however, that when the corporation is insolvent during 
the wrongful transactions, shareholder ratification would not legiti-
mate the officers' fraud so as to preclude an action on behalf of the 
creditors. 
Thus, it would appear that shareholder ratification cannot de-
feat the rights of the creditors of an insolvent corporation, and that 
the trustee in bankruptcy can maintain an action against the corpo-
rate officers on behalf of the creditors even though a one-man cor-
poration would be bound by the ratified acts of its sole stockholder. 
It is not clear, however, that the trustee can maintain an action 
against the corporation's bank. Where trustees in bankruptcy have 
sued a depositary bank for negligence, the theory has generally been 
that the trustee's action is based on the rights of the corporation 
which have theoretically been transferred to him. But, as has been 
pointed out above, it would appear that in the case of a one-man 
corporation the bank should have no duty to the corporation, and 
therefore the corporation would have no right against the bank 
which could be transferred to the trustee. If the trustee can recover 
without having had any rights of the corporation transferred to him, 
his cause of action must depend on the bank's breach of some duty 
owed directly to the creditors. 
Deferring for the moment questions of policy and allocation of 
18. E.g., Field v. Lew, 184 F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Wilds v. Lebanon Nat'! 
Bank, 219 App. Div. 597, 220 N.Y. Supp. 480, afj'd, 245 N.Y. 629, 157 N.E. 886, cert. 
denied, 275 U.S. 568 (1927). 
19. "Creditors, of course, are not prejudiced by the corporation's acts of ratifica-
tion." Field v. Lew, supra note 18, at 27, quoting from, Barr &: Creelman Co. v. Zeller, 
109 F.2d 924, 927 (2d Cir. 1940). See also McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U.S. 140 (1935); 
Bovay v. Byllesby &: Co., 26 Del. Ch. 69, 22 A.2d 138 (Ch. 1941); Metropolitan Trust v. 
Becklenberg, 300 Ill. App. 453, 21 N.E.2d 152 (1939). 
20. 296 U.S. 140 (1935). Defendant corporate officer had fraudulently obtained 
profits while rendering his company insolvent. It was asserted as a defense that all 
the stockholders had ratified his transactions. In discussing the question of the plain-
tiff receiver's standing, the Court stated: 
Consent in such conditions so far as it gives approval to conduct in fraud 
of the rights of others, is a word and nothing more •••• Included in those assets 
are moneys fraudulently diverted to the prejudice of creditors • • •• There is 
power at the instance of the receiver to bring them back into the trust. 
Id. at 160. Four Justices joined in a dissenting opinion which forcefully advances the 
theory that since all of the stockholders ratified the transaction, the receiver could 
not attack it. Id. at 168. 
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risks and burdens, there is legal justification for permitting the 
trustee, as the representative of the creditors of an insolvent one-
man corporation and wholly apart from any rights of the corpora-
tion, to bring a direct action against the bank. According to one 
theory, the bank could, on the facts of the principal case, be held 
liable to the creditors for having misled them through assurances of 
the good credit of the company. The giving of assurances, without 
more, would not make the bank liable, but an inordinate number of 
inquiries coupled with a corporate officer's frequent cashing of rela-
tively large checks payable to the corporation might be used to sup-
port the imposition of a duty on the bank to protect known creditors 
who might reasonably be expected to rely on the bank's assurances.21 
A second, and perhaps more cogent, rationale for the imposition 
of a duty to the creditors is that because, as noted above, the inquiry 
of a sole stockholder regarding his authority to transact is an empty 
obligation, the bank's duty should be extended when its depositor 
is a one-man corporation. Thus, the combination of a one-man or 
closely owned corporation and patently suspicious circumstances sur-
rounding its transactions would seemingly require the bank to in-
vestigate its corporate depositor's financial condition. When reason-
able inquiry would reveal the insolvency of the corporation, the 
bank should be charged with knowledge of this insolvency. Since an 
officer's diversion of his insolvent corporation's assets is a fraud on 
the corporate creditors, the argument continues, a bank, on notice 
of the insolvency of its corporate depositor, should assume some 
obligation to protect the creditors from such fraud. This theory of 
liability presupposes that charging a depositary bank with notice of 
its depositor's insolvency is justifiable, a presupposition which is not 
without precedent. In Field v. Lew,22 a trustee in bankruptcy sued 
the bankrupt corporation's depositary bank challenging three trans-
actions between the corporate president and the bank. With respect 
to the first two transactions, accomplished while the corporation was 
solvent, the court adopted the ratification doctrine and held that 
the president, as sole stockholder, bound the corporation by his acts. 
The third transaction, however, involved a large corporate check 
which rendered the corporation insolvent and which the president 
drew payable to himself. After noting that creditors cannot be preju-
diced by a corporation's acts of ratification, the court determined, 
primarily in light of a resolution which authorized the president to 
draw corporate checks payable to himself, that on the facts before 
it nothing "sufficiently" put the bank on inquiry so as to require it 
21. On the duty to disclose information and liability for erroneous disclosure, 
see Annots., 92 A.L.R.2d 900 (1963); 48 A.L.R. 528 (1927). See also Comment, Banking-
Disclosure of Records, 60 MICH. L. REv. 781 (1962). 
22. 184: F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). 
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to ascertain the adequacy of corporate assets or to determine whether 
each transaction impaired the capital.23 The implication of this 
reasoning is that had there been more suspicious circumstances, a 
bank would have a duty of inquiry to the extent of determining the 
corporate depositor's financial position. Field cited with approval 
Ward v. City Trust Co.,24 .although it distinguished Ward on its 
facts. In Ward, the court, holding that the bank was put on notice 
by the "extraordinary circumstances," asserted that reasonable in-
quiry meant an inquiry prosecuted with a degree of diligence com-
mensurate with the circumstances. The court concluded that since 
an inquiry of the officers of the close corporation would have been 
insufficient because it was apparent that the officers were acting in 
their own interest,25 the circumstances demanded an investigation 
of the financial condition of the company, which would have re-
vealed its insolvency.26 
In imposing on the bank a duty to the creditors, the court in the 
principal case seems to have relied primarily on the second theory 
discussed above, that is, the bank's obligation to discover the in-
solvency of its one-man corporate depositor. The court's decision 
suggests, by its effect if not by its language, that in this situation the 
duty of the bank to inquire transcends questioning the authority to 
transact. If the circumstances surrounding a series of transactions 
indicate a fraud on the creditors, the bank's duty extends to an in-
vestigation of the :financial condition of the company. 
Had the court in the principal case been reluctant to impose 
such a duty on the bank and then derive the bank's liability from 
the breach of this duty, there is little doubt that liability could have 
been based solely on the bank's failure to comply with the deposit 
resolutions.27 However, rather than predicate liability for a $46,000 
23. Id. at 28. 
24. 192 N.Y. 61, 84 N.E. 585 (1908). The creditors sued the bank for accepting 
corporate checks from the sole stockholder•corporate officer in payment of his per-
sonal loan. The checks represented a large proportion of the corporation's assets, 
and the proceeds were obviously devoted to non-corporate purposes. 
25, Compare Ward v. City Trust Co., supra note 24, with Reif v. Equitable Life 
Assur. Soc'y, 268 N.Y. 269 (1935), and Kinstlinger v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 280 
App. Div. 729, 117 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1952). 
26. The form of the check and its amount when compared with that of the 
capital stock required investigation or inquiry as to the solvency of the company 
•••• The trust company had a right to assume that Umsted and Kiefer, as the 
sole owners of the stock, could lawfully use the assets of the corporation for their 
own purposes, still the assumption would necessarily be limited to the corpora-
tion itself. It could not extend to the creditors whose rights are supreme and 
which cannot be sacrificed even by the joint action of all the officers, directors 
and stockholders of the corporation. 
Ward v. City Trust Co., 192 N.Y. 61, 75 (1908). 
27. The circuit court found that the bank had failed in two ways to conform 
to the resolutions. First, the checks cashed by Shulman were not cosigned by Paul. 
Also, the checks were not endorsed "for deposit and collection in the corporate ac-
count," but were endorsed for cash or deposit into Shulman's personal account. See 
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judgment on such technical grounds,28 the court determined that 
the bank was not a holder in due course under the Illinois Uniform 
Commercial Code,29 and therefore that it took the checks cashed by 
Shulman subject to all valid claims against them.80 Presumably the 
court could have concluded at this point that the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, as successor to the corporation:s claims, could recover the 
note 2 supra. A bank cannot legally pay out its depositor's funds except on the 
approval and signature which it has been instructed is necessary. National City 
Bank v. Harbin Elec. Co., 28 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1928); Miller v. First Granite City 
Nat'! Bank, 349 Ill. App. 347, llO N.E.2d 651 (1953). Although bank resolutions on 
file govern the bank's liability, such liability is not governed by resolutions which 
might be on file or which are received after the facts giving rise to liability have 
transpired. Barrett v. Continental Ill. Nat'! Bank, 2 Ill. App. 2d 70, 118 N.E.2d 
631 (1954). 
28. Principal case at 402. Although the original resolutions had never been re-
scinded by the requisite writing, apparently the court felt that to continue to require 
a second signature on the checks after Shulman was sole ~tockholder and Paul, the 
joint signatory, was no longer interested in the corporation, would have been con-
trary to the intent of the deposit agreement. Regarding the second alleged violation 
of the resolutions-unauthorized endorsements-the court may have been persuaded 
that Shulman's endorsement for cash was in effect tantamount to a two-step transac-
tion of depositing in the account and then drawing corporate checks against the 
account. This two-step transaction would have conformed to the resolutions. It 
should be noted, however, that if Shulman had employed the two-step procedure, the 
transaction would have shown up in the bank's record of the depositor's account 
and would have constituted a more reasonable basis on which to charge the bank 
with notice. By merely cashing the checks for Shulman, the bank had no record 
of the frequency of Shulman's transactions. 
29. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26 (1963). The relevant sections of the Code are as follows: 
§ 3-302. Holder in Due Course. 
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument 
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored 
or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of 
any person. 
§ 3.304. Notice to Purchaser. 
(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument 
when he has knowledge that a fiduciary has negotiated the in-
strument in payment of or as security for his own debt or in 
any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in breach 
of duty. 
The court reasoned that the bank had notice of Shulman's breach of fiduciary duty 
from the resolutions which it had on file. Therefore, the bank could not be a holder 
in due course. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, §§ 3-302(l)(c), 3-304(2) (1963). The court's con-
clusion is questionable inasmuch as § 3-304(4)(e) states that knowledge of an officer's 
fiduciary capacity is not the notice required by the section. These same words in the 
UNIFORM FIDUCIARIES ACT § 8 have been held to require actual notice of misappropri-
ation. Colby v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 92 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1937). If the court believed 
that the original resolutions continued to control any transactions, a more persuasive 
argument might have been that under § 3-419(l)(c), Shulman's unauthorized signature 
was a forgery. According to that section, the bank would then be a converter of the 
checks and liable to the real owner. 
30. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-306(a) (1963). 
§ 3-306. Rights of One Not Holder in Due Course. 
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person 
takes the instrument subject to 
(a) All valid claims to it on the part of any person •.•• 
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amount of the checks.31 However, the court reasoned that to estab-
lish that the bank was not a holder in due course was not sufficient; 
rather, the trustee must also establish the validity of his claims. The 
court concluded that the bank's notice of a breach of fiduciary duty 
disqualifies it from being a holder in due course, but that in order 
to establish the validity of the claims, proof of gross negligence on 
the part of the bank was also required. 32 This latter element of 
proof is not incorporated in the Code itself, and this judicial graft-
ing of gross negligence is one of the significant aspects of the princi-
pal case. 
Gross negligence entails a serious breach of some duty. If the 
findings in the principal case were based on a theory of a breach 
of a duty owed to the corporation, creating a cause of action which 
passes to the trustee in bankruptcy, it has been suggested above that 
given the facts of this case, such reasoning will not withstand logical 
analysis.33 If, on the other hand, the court was propounding a theory 
of liability based on a breach of a duty to the creditors, it should 
have more fully articulated the scope and extent of the duty.34 
Assuming, arguendo, that the bank does have a duty to discover the 
insolvency of its corporate depositor, it is unclear from the opinion 
whether the bank is required to take affirmative action to protect 
the creditors of its corporate depositor or whether its duty is a lesser 
one of refusing to allow its facilities to be used in suspected fraudu-
!II. Had the court been more confident of its conclusion that the bank had the 
actual notice required by the Code, it could have held the bank liable simply because 
it wa~ not a holder in due course. Since its finding of actual notice is contingent 
on the viability of the resolutions, the court apparently felt the need to find an , 
additional basis of liability. 
32. Principal case at 402. Not only is proof of gross negligence probably unnecessary 
rn the bank were truly not a holder in due course, but a more logical argument 
might be that even if the bank were a holder in due course, it could still be held 
liable for negligence. Section 3-305, defining the rights of a holder in due course, 
does not appear to preclude liability for negligence. Thus, if the court is able to 
find gross negligence, the fact that the bank was not a holder in due course might 
have been irrelevant. 
33. See notes 12-17 supra and accompanying text. Generally courts have been more 
sympathetic to the distinction between one-man and other corporations than have 
the legislatures. See Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man 
Company, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1373 (1938). The Illinois Legislature has recently recog-
nized that a one-man corporation can have a one-man board of directors. ILL. REV. 
STAT. Ch. 32, § 157.34 (1963) (adopted Aug. 14, 1963). The court in the principal case 
found it unnecessary to pass on the question whether the sole stockholder and the 
corporation were identical for the purposes involved in the case. Principal case at 398. 
34. The court in the principal case intimates that the duty was owed to the 
creditors themselves. After deciding that the bank had notice the court added: "the 
defendant bank made absolutely no significant effort either to protect itself or other 
creditors." Principal case at 399. The closest that the court comes to articulating the 
duty to discover the insolvency of the company is the statement that "the astounding 
volume of purchases that such an undertaking would entail would be considered 
together with the relative size of National Lumber of which the bank was duty-bound 
to have knowledge." Principal case at 399. 
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lent transactions. The precise action which the bank must take in 
order to escape liability to the creditors depends upon which of 
these two interpretations of the bank's duty is an accurate statement 
of the law. 
If the obligation of the bank is to take affirmative action to pro-
tect the creditors, it may have two possible alternatives. First, the 
bank might admonish the known creditors, which would accelerate 
the petition for bankruptcy and might mitigate the loss to the 
creditors. This alternative, however, might violate the contract rights 
of the depositor for it is an implied term of the contract between a 
depositor and his bank that no information may be disclosed by the 
bank unless such disclosure is authorized by the depositor or com-
pelled by law.35 Viewed from another perspective, at least one case86 
has held that banks are under no duty at law to warn the investing 
public of the financial condition of their depositors.37 The bank's sec-
ond alternative is to refuse to honor the transactions of the suspected 
defalcator. But, Cunningham v. Merchant's National Bank38 held 
that a bank is not relieved of its duty to honor its depositors orders, 
even though it may know that the depositor is insolvent.39 Further-
more, as long as there are funds in the bank sufficient to meet the 
orders of the depositor, dishonor of an order might subject the 
bank to an action by the depositor for damages:10 It is arguable that 
the bank in the principal case would merely be refusing to cash 
checks, so that it would not come within the wrongful dishonor 
35. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1963); see Annot., 
92 A.L.R.2d 900 (1963). See also Comment, Banking-Disclosure of Records, 60 MICH. L. 
REv. 781 (1962). One might argue that Shulman, by directing sellers to the defendant 
for a credit reference, consented to publication of whatever information the bank 
considered appropriate. 
36. Cunningham v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 4 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1925). 
37. "Investors may be presumed to keep themselves reasonably informed as to the 
financial capacity of the persons with whom they are dealing in their investments." Id. at 
30. See also Taylor v. Commercial .Bank, 174 N.Y. 181, 66 N.E. 726 (1903), holding the 
bank not liable to a seller of goods on credit to insolvent depositor for erroneous 
information disclosed by the cashier, because such disclosure was not within the duty 
of the cashier. It should be noted that one of the logical implications of the decision in 
the principal case may be that once the bank is put on notice of possible misappropria• 
tion, it has a duty to disclose this information, and its disclosure will be "compelled by 
law." If this inference is accurate, the case casts considerable doubt upon the general 
rule of non-liability for erroneous disclosure. Several additional questions are left un-
answered. If the bank is required to warn known creditors, how can it identify the 
creditors who are entitled to the information? Will the corporation have an action 
against the bank if the bank, mistakenly believing its corporate depositor to be in-
solvent, discloses this erroneous information to the creditors and damages the corpora-
tion's business and reputation? 
38. 4 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1925). 
39. Id. at 29. 
40. Armstrong v. American Exch. Bank, 133 U.S. 433 (1890); accord, United States 
Cold Storage v. Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 343 Ill. 503, 175 N.E. 825 (1931). See also 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-402 8e comment. 
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rules; however, since the corporate president could have depos-
ited the checks to the corporation's account and then drawn checks 
against the account, it may be argued that the rules should apply 
with equal force to the officer's chosen method of transacting. 
If the bank's duty is not to take affirmative protective measures 
but merely to refuse to participate in the suspected fraudulent trans-
actions, the dissent in Cunningham suggests other routes by which 
the bank might avoid liability. In response to the majority's con-
tention that the threat of liability would place an intolerable bur-
den on the banking machinery in that the bank would have to deter-
mine at its peril both insolvency and fraud, the dissenting judge 
argued that the bank could easily insulate itself from liability by 
refusing to open an account for the insolvent corporation or, if the 
insolvent is already a depositor, by closing the account.41 Although 
neither course of action would satisfy an affirmative duty to protect 
the creditors of the corporate depositor, both would terminate the 
particular bank's involvement in the fraud and thus fulfill the lesser 
duty of refusing to participate in the suspected misappropriations. 
Although the court in the principal case fails to specify what the 
bank could have done to avoid liability, the decision seems to imply 
that the bank should have chosen one of these several uncomfortable 
alternatives. 42 
Clearly the approach of the dissent in Cunningham does not take 
account of many of the policy considerations which must be bal-
anced in cases involving a bank's liability for negligence. Although 
this casenote does not purport to evaluate extensively the equities 
and policies that are relevant to these determinations, it is sub-
mitted that the following factors do deserve some consideration. In 
our computerized society, credit and commercial paper are the basic 
tools of business and finance, and it has been estimated that banks 
now handle 25,000,000 items in a business day.48 In this context, the 
enormity of the burden placed on the bank in the principal case 
should be readily apparent. This burden is even more difficult to 
41. Cunningham v. Merchant's Nat'! Bank, 4 F.2d 25, 45 (1925). A bank may select 
its customers arbitrarily, and its act in refusing an account is not open to question. A 
bank may receive deposits one day and the next day it may return the amount deposited 
and refuse to transact further with the depositor. Jaselli v. Riggs Nat'! Bank, 36 App. 
D.C. 159 (1911); Chicago Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Stanford, 28 III. 168 (1862); 
cf. Cunningham v. Merchant's Nat'! Bank, supra. 
42. In its discussion of gross negligence, the court in the principal case stated that 
the defendant bank was required to treat "National Lumber and particularly Shulman 
with that degree of caution as it would any other new customer who to the bank 
would be no more than a stranger off the street." Principal case at 399; 
43. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-103, comment 3. See also Dunne, Variations on 
a Theme by Parkinson or Some Proposals for the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
Checkless Society, 75 YALE L.J. 788 (1966). 
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justify when it is examined in the light of modem banking proce-
dures. In mere check cashing transactions such as those involved in 
the principal case, the bank is functioning as a collecting bank, and 
generally no evidence of the transactions or of the frequency of such 
transactions will appear in the records of the depositor's account. 
Also, the other factor which supposedly puts the bank on notice, the 
unusual number of credit inquiries, becomes less significant once 
it is realized that typically these inquiries will be received by several 
officers of the bank, each of whom may be totally unaware of similar 
inquiries which had been directed to the others. Finally it should be 
noted that except for the benefits of good will, banks perform their 
check cashing services gratuitously, and that to hold them to the 
standard of care required by the principal case would undoubtedly 
jeopardize the continuation of this practice. 
Thus, as between a bank and a corporation, policy would seem 
to favor putting the burden on the corporation to scrutinize the acts 
of its ovm officers. However, where, as in the principal case, the 
corporate entity is at most a shadow, public policy may dictate the 
protection of the innocent creditors despite the possible adverse 
impact on banking operations.44 The conclusion of the court in 
the principal case to hold the bank liable for the loss to the credi-
tors may have been a reasonable resolution of the conflicting in-
terests and may be justifiable in terms of the particular facts of the 
case; that is, a small bank in which all of the credit inquiries are 
directed to a single officer and in which it is likely that a series of 
transactions involving the cashing of checks for large amounts by 
one individual will come to the attention of one of the few tellers 
present. However, had the court thoroughly examined the issue of 
the duty to the creditors, and had it more clearly articulated the 
position it appears to have assumed, it would have seen the need to 
limit its holding to the facts, and it might therefore have offered a 
clearer standard by which banks, in the future, might safely conduct 
themselves. 
44. For opposing views on whether the bank or the corporation should bear the 
risk of liability for misappropriation by a fiduciary, compare Merrill, Bankers' Liability 
for Deposits of a Fiduciary to his Personal Account, 40 HARV. L. REv. 1077 (1927), 
with Comment, Responsibility of a Bank for Misappropriation by a Fiduciary, 35 YALE 
L.J. 854 (1926). 
